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ABSTRACT
This paper evaluates a possible US-SACU (Southern African Customs Union) free trade agreement
as part of a US approach to new preferential trade agreements characterized by the term
"competitive liberalization." This is the idea that competition among large countries (US/EU) to
negotiate preferential arrangements with smaller countries or regions will lower barriers, and
eventually add fresh impulse to new multilateral WTO negotiations. In commercial policy terms,
the US interest in such an arrangement lies in improved access to a smaller but more protected
market where the EU already has preferential arrangements, and the SACU interest lies in improved
access to a much larger but less protected market. There is also a SACU interest in weakening the
trade restrictive effects of MFA quotas in the US for apparel imports. The risk of entrapment in
extremely complex rules of origin arrangements which at times close markets (as in NAFTA and
other US bilaterals) is a concern for SACU. Also, gains to SACU may be only temporary because
of the US proposal to eliminate non agricultural tariffs entirely in the WTO by 2015. In key non
commodity trade areas (services, investment, intellectual property, temporary entry of business
persons), if other US bilaterals are any guide most liberalization requested will be heavily
asymmetric if not unilateral on the SACU side. SACU does not currently cover any of these items
since it is only a customs union, and prior negotiation will be needed among SACU countries.
SACU also clearly has an interest in coordinating its negotiation with other US bilateral negotiating
partners. These and other barriers to negotiation (including negotiating capacity constraints in
several SACU members) will influence the outcome of negotiations.
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Introduction 
This conference is devoted to the analysis of actual and potential regional trade initiatives 
proposed by the United States over the last year or so for various parts of the world.  The broad 
rubric for this set of initiatives is “competitive liberalization,” the idea that a sequence of barrier 
reducing preferential initiatives undertaken by the US and the EU in competition one with 
another for smaller regional markets can serve to spur global trade growth and also sow the seeds 
for a successful conclusion to the WTO Doha round in 2007 by partially reducing some barriers 
first (see Bergsten (2002) and Zoellick (2002)).  These latest bilaterals stand in contrast to 
preferential trade arrangements in the 1980s and 90s such as the Canada-US Agreement and 
NAFTA, which were typically initiated by the smaller parties seeking security of access (or 
insurance, to paraphrase Perroni and Whalley (2000)).  A counter argument to the claimed likely 
success of this new competitive thrust in moving multilateral liberalization forward is that by 
establishing margins of preference in large markets for middle sized entities, blocking coalitions 
of groups of countries who would otherwise lose margins of preference may be created who will 
oppose new multilateral liberalization.  There is no theoretical reason why competitive 
liberalization will achieve its stated aim, but on the other hand it could.  The proof of the pudding 
in our view will be in the eating. 
Here we discuss a possible US bilateral arrangement with the Southern African Customs 
Union (SACU), consisting of South Africa, Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia, and Swaziland, 
assessing both its potential contribution to the overall US strategy and the impacts on SACU 
countries.  Thus far, in addition to NAFTA, four US agreements have been concluded (with 
Israel (1985), Jordan (2001), Chile (agreed 2003), and Singapore (agreed 2003)).  Several others  
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seem slated to follow, including Morocco, Australia, ASEAN and Central America.  We assume 
there has been a conscious policy choice by the US to negotiate with the whole of SACU rather 
than only with South Africa, in contrast with the Europeans who have two separate agreements -- 
one with South Africa and the other with the African, Caribbean, and Pacific (ACP) countries 
under the Cotonou agreement, which includes the smaller SACU members, Botswana, Lesotho, 
Namibia, and Swaziland (BLNS).  It is important to note that SACU is for now only a customs 
union; there is no coverage of key non commodity trade issues such as services, investment, 
intellectual property and other areas.  If these are substantively included in a US agreement (they 
are effectively not, save competition policy, in the prior EU-South Africa agreement) there will 
need to be a prior internal SACU negotiation.  Also, constraints on government capacity to 
participate are a major factor, both in terms of expertise and relative to other urgent policy issues 
in several SACU members.  Whether the US should also seek wider humanitarian goals when 
negotiating (such as an offer of waiver of drug patent rights for treatment of AIDS) is another 
issue. 
We assume, for now, that a US-SACU agreement would likely follow the broad contours 
of the recently signed Singapore and Chile agreements, although in practice there will of course 
be differences.  These are NAFTAesque in incorporating duty free trade in goods (following 
transitional arrangements), with extremely complex NAFTA likes rules of origin in 
textiles/apparel and autos and many other areas, as well as related provisions covering 
intellectual property, investment protection, temporary entry of business persons, and bilateral 
dispute settlement.  They go well beyond NAFTA in the coverage of services, as well as 
competition policy.  
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We suggest that SACU’s interest, while that of 5 countries collectively, will likely be 
dominated by the interests of its predominant member, South Africa.  These are multifaceted.  
South African trade policy was for many years highly protectionist, in part because of anti-
apartheid sanctions, and focused on trade with local hinterland small market economies with 
transportation routes through South Africa.  This policy focus has changed substantially in recent 
years with liberalization in South Africa, first under WTO negotiations (Uruguay Round), and 
later under the 1999 bilateral FTA between the EU and South Africa.  South Africa is already 
liberalizing. 
As Table 1 below indicates South African exports to the EU and to Asia are considerably 
larger than to NAFTA, and exports to the region are also large.  Trade with NAFTA is not the 
dominant South African interest it might seem from the outside.  Also, given the high 
unemployment rates in South Africa, any trade agreement perceived to exacerbate this problem 
may be hard to navigate through domestic opposition. 
Table 1:  South African Trade Shares With Selected Regions, 2000 
(percentage shares) 
 





Source: Cassim et al., 2002, Table 6.6 
In this paper we make six points relating to the evaluation of the impacts such an 
arrangement and the possible benefits to the two sides.  First, the gains in conventional trade 
policy terms lie in improved access for SACU to a large North American market, while for the  
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US the SACU market is much smaller.  The asymmetry in size is partially offset by a substantial 
(if now diminished) asymmetry in initial barriers which are considerably higher in SACU.  
However, if multilateral elimination of non-agriculture tariffs in the WTO were to occur in 2015 
as per the latest US Doha Round proposal, such benefits to SACU members would be temporary.  
A SACU-US FTA, coming on top of the South Africa-EU FTA might also speed the reduction of 
SACU’s MFN trade barriers, better preparing the SACU producers for multilateral free trade in 
non-agricultural goods.  But the reduction of trade barriers also means reduction of tariff 
revenue, an important consideration for some of the smaller SACU members, making the 
development of alternative revenue sources such as a value-added tax, all the more urgent.  
Potential complexities in rules of origin are another key issue. 
Second, a potentially important benefit for SACU may be in access in the textiles/apparel 
sector that is free from quotas under the MFA (and trade regime that eventually replaces it).  
There has been rapid growth in recent years of apparel exports from SACU to the US, 
encouraged in part by the AGOA facility and some elements of the MFA phase-out, but some 
products still remain restrained by quotas.  Potential benefits here for SACU may be significant, 
as well as for US fiber producers under the yarn forward rules of origin in textiles/apparel.  
Hence not only does possible multilateral tariff elimination enter, but also MFA elimination in 
2004. 
Third, the implementation of an extensive agreement covering services, intellectual 
property, and competition policy poses special problems for SACU.  SACU does not cover these 
matters.  The smaller countries are still in the process of developing updated competition policy 
statutes; intellectual property regimes are in process also, designed for compliance with WTO’s  
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TRIPS; and financial institutions are regulated under national authorities in each SACU country.  
While these are all issues included in the Doha Round agenda, their potential inclusion in a likely 
more immediate bilateral with the US may encounter complexities and inconsistencies.  Perhaps 
most importantly, if the US-Chile and US-Singapore arrangements are a guide, requested 
liberalization may well be highly asymmetric and in some areas (such as banking and insurance) 
involve larger (and even in some areas unilateral) concessions on the SACU side. 
Fourth, the prior completion of a bilateral FTA between South Africa and the EU in 1999 
and the EU-ACP Cotonou agreement covering the smaller members of SACU are further factors 
involved in a US-SACU negotiation.  The US will want to restore their competitive position in 
SACU markets, giving SACU some negotiating room.  The form and content of the two bilateral 
relationships – US-SACU and EU-SACU -- will raise issues with their joint operation.  The EU 
arrangements sidestep the most significant non commodity trade issues likely to be raised by a 
US negotiation. 
Fifth, the multi country nature of SACU, combined with the fact that it covers only goods 
trade may cause problems.  SACU will have to both agree on how to treat issues such as 
services, intellectual property, investment, temporary entry of business persons, and competition 
policy and how to expand its coverage of these issues before it can negotiate bilaterally with the 
US.  This raises the issues of negotiating capacity and institutional infrastructure.  SACU’s 
relationship with the wider SADC (14 Countries) grouping in the region (and individual SACU 
members' bilateral arrangements with Zimbabwe) will also likely need some refocusing as a 
result. 
Finally, although the focus of a US-SACU arrangement will be on commercial policy  
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considerations, there are clearly wider implications in terms of humanitarian and developmental 
objectives for US foreign policy in the region.  Even if the benefits of such an arrangement were 
to accrue more than proportionately to SACU (which given the services situation is by no means 
clear), such an arrangement still fits within wider US aid and development objectives towards 
Africa.  These were the motives behind the recent US initiative for Africa Growth and 
Opportunity Act (AGOA).  A bilateral US-SACU arrangement is complementary to this, and 
promises somewhat more permanence than the time-limited and unilateral AGOA.  But key 
developmental issues may almost certainly be raised in a bilateral negotiation: How will poverty 
in Southern Africa be affected?  What about patent rights of AIDS drugs?  How will growth be 
affected? 
Thus, overall, while we see a bilateral US-SACU FTA as highly negotiable, especially if it 
is limited in its services and related provisions, it may only offer SACU temporary and relatively 
small benefits if US MFN tariffs are already low.  In contrast, liberalization in non commodity 
trade areas, and the associated regulatory reform within SACU members, may be more 
significant.  The prior EU-South Africa arrangement provides added US incentives to pursue a 
bilateral, but also in its own way complicates things.  Complexities arise with the overlapping 
regional arrangements already existing in the region.  And foreign policy issues and domestic 
SACU macro policy concerns enter.  But, both the reduction of barriers to goods trade, and 
liberalization of other areas, are likely to be growth-promoting and potentially poverty-reducing 
in SACU.  Such a thrust is also clearly in the foreign policy interest of the US. 
What is SACU? 
SACU refers to the Southern Africa Customs Union, a grouping of five countries  
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(Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia, South Africa, and Swaziland) who maintain a common external 
tariff to third countries.  Most trade goes through South Africa, and economically the grouping is 
dominated by South Africa which accounts for a large majority of the GDP of the region.   
While the SACU arrangement dates from 1910, it has been renegotiated on various 
occasions, with the most substantial changes made in 1969 and 2002.  The renegotiation 
completed in 2002 was initiated in November 1994, shortly after the launching of the 
Government of National Unity in South Africa.  The five members of SACU are also all 
members of the 14 member Southern African Development Community (SADC), and several 
members of SACU have long-standing bilateral trade arrangements with other countries of the 
region.  Furthermore, these arrangements are evolving independently of the proposed US-SACU 
free trade agreement.  Also important to the background is the bilateral EU-South African trade 
and cooperation agreement of 1999, and the long-standing EU-ACP agreement which covers the 
smaller members of SACU, which we take up below.  
  The basic elements of SACU are a common external tariff, common excise duties, and a 
compensation (or revenue) distribution formula between members.  The latest treaty changed the 
compensation formula, and introduced new governance and administration arrangements (Kirk 
and Stern, 2003).  The SACU compensation formula had previously transferred revenues to the 
smaller members on the basis of shares of the value of their imports from all sources (including 
elsewhere in SACU) plus consumption of excisable goods.  All the revenues from the common 
external tariff and the common excise duties on third country imports were paid into the South 
African Treasury, and after payments made to the smaller members, South Africa retained the  
  -10- 
residual balance (Hudson, 1981)
1.  That arrangement under compensated the smaller members 
relative to direct application of the tariff to their third country trade before the implementation of 
the Uruguay Round tariff cuts (Leith, 1992), but in later years may have overcompensated them 
for the net costs of the common external tariff.  The new formula simply divides up the revenue 
collected from the common external tariff, and does so on the basis of shares of intra-SACU 
trade. 
  In addition, the distribution of the common excise duties switched to a sharing on the 
basis of shares of GDP adjusted at the margin to favor the poorer members.  The new 
arrangement means that any reduction in the customs pool due to lower average tariffs or duty-
free access under the EU-SA bilateral and the proposed US-SACU bilateral arrangement will be 
of concern to those members that rely heavily on this revenue source -- Lesotho and Swaziland, 
and to a lesser extent Namibia. 
New SACU institutional arrangements under the latest treaty also create a Secretariat to 
manage the affairs of SACU;  a SACU tariff board to replace the South African Board of Tariffs 
and Trade which previously set and adjusted the common external tariff; and an independent ad 
hoc tribunal to arbitrate disputes.  Establishing these institutions is still under way.  At the time 
of writing the head of the secretariat has yet to be named, and the process for amending the 
common external tariff has yet to be established.  A US-SACU agreement would thus be 
negotiated in a period when SACU itself is in institutional flux. 
  The new SACU agreement also raises for the first time the possibility of establishing 
common policies in a limited number of areas beyond tariffs and excise duties.   There is a 
                                                 
1 The old formula also contained an amplification of the share of imports plus exciseable consumption to 
compensate the smaller members for the disadvantages that they faced such as lack of fiscal discretion, plus  
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commitment to harmonize product and technical standards, and to apply product standards and 
technical regulations in accordance with the WTO.  Members have agreed to develop common 
policies and strategies on industrial development.  On agricultural policies, members have agreed 
to co-operate with each other, with the aim of ensuring coordinated development of agriculture.  
Each is committed to having a competition policy (but for most of the smaller members that 
remains to be achieved) and to cooperate on the enforcement of competition laws and 
regulations.  Finally, members are committed to develop SACU-wide policies to address unfair 
trade practices between members.  The new agreement does not set out the nature or detail of 
these common policies.  Much remains to be done, and the capacity among the smaller members 
for policy development on intra-SACU issues is severely limited, given other very pressing 
policy questions that must be addressed.  All of this evolution will also complicate a US-SACU 
negotiation. 
The Content of a Possible US-SACU Arrangement 
  Predicting the outcome of a bilateral trade negotiation is always difficult, but to have a 
rough sense of what a US-SACU agreement could look like is clearly germane to any evaluation 
of both the impact of and interests of the parties to such an arrangement.  Our assumption is that 
a US-SACU agreement would broadly follow the contours of the already negotiated US-
Singapore and US-Chile deals, since such an agreement would be seen from the US side as 
fitting into its broad strategy of competitive liberalization.
2  As one of the more heavily protected 
significant markets around the world, from a US position such an agreement would have the 
                                                                                                                                                             
minimum and maximum provisions. 
2 Our interpretation of these agreements in based primarily on the USTR (2002) summaries and the reports of the US 
Advisory Committee for Trade Policy and Negotiations.  The lengthy texts of the US-Chile and US-Singapore 
agreements have only recently become publicly available.  
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explicit objective of restoring the US market position in the Southern African market given the 
1999 EU-South African Free Trade Agreement and the Cotonou Agreement (see section 6 
below). 
  The assumption from the US side is that the US would negotiate on its own and 
independently of its NAFTA partners.  There is nothing in the structure NAFTA which precludes 
this.   We see the following elements as a likely package which could emerge. 
  Trade in Goods 
  We would anticipate that all duties between the US and SACU would be removed on a 
bilateral basis.  The majority of tariff line items (say 85% as in the Chile agreement) would 
become duty free upon signing.  The remainder would be phased out over a five year 
implementation period. 
  Rules of origin, as in NAFTA, would most likely apply.  These would likely be extremely 
complex and detailed.  Not only would they involve a two way test of significant transformation 
(perhaps 50% of manufacturing content) and a change in tariff nomenclature on reexport but 
many detailed product and sectoral prisons would certainly apply.  Brenton (2003) discusses how 
the Singapore-US Agreement in draft form contains 240 pages of text on rules or origin with 
mind bewildering detail.
3  A SACU arrangement would almost certainly encounter similar 
                                                 
3 To quote Brenton (pp. 29-31) “The rules of origin for clothing products in the proposed Singapore-US FTA 
provide an example of how complex the rules can become and how difficult they must be for producers to satisfy 
and prove compliance.  The following example is for men’s or boy’s overcoats made of wool: 
620111 A change to subheading 620111 from any other chapter, except from heading 5106 through 5113, 5204 
through 5212, 5307 through 5308 or 5310 through 5311, Chapter 54 or heading 5508 through 5516, 5801 through 
5802 or 6001 through 6006, provided that: 
(a) the good is both cut and sewn or otherwise assembled in the territory of one or more of the Parties, and 
(b) the visible lining fabric listed in Note 1 to Chapter 62 satisfies the tariff change requirements provided therein. 
The requirements of Note 1 are that 
Chapter Rule 1:  Except for fabrics classified in 54082210, 54082311, 54082321, and 54082410, the fabrics 
identified in the following sub-headings and headings, when used as visible lining material in certain men’s and  
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problems as such rules are used as trade exclusion devices.  In the two critical areas of 
textiles/apparel and autos/parts, NAFTA rules of origin would likely apply.  These would 
involve duty free treatment only for apparel items made from US or SACU fibers, and US-
SACU yarn and yarn processing (the so-called yarn forward rule).  In autos/parts, where SACU 
exports have been growing rapidly in recent years, the 60% NAFTA local content rule for duty 
free treatment would most likely apply. 
  In agriculture, if the Chilean agreement sets a precedent, while there will eventually be 
duty free treatment, it will be phased in differentially across the two country groupings.  In the 
US-Chile agreement Chilean agricultural duties disappear after 4 year period, while bilateral US 
                                                                                                                                                             
women’s suits, suit-type jackets, skirts, overcoats, carcoats, anoraks, windbreakers, and similar articles, must be 
formed from yarn and finished in the territory of a party:  5111 through 5112, 520831 through 520859, 520931 
through 520959, 521031 through 521059, 521131 through 521159, 521213 through 521215, 521223 through 
521225, 540742 through 540744, 540752 through 540754, 540761, 540772 through 540774, 540782 through 
540784, 540792 through 540794, 540822 through 540824 (excluding tariff item 540822aa, 540823aa or 540824aa), 
540832 through 540834, 551219, 551229, 551299, 551321 through 551349, 551421 through 551599, 551612 
through 551614, 551622 through 551624, 551632 through 551634, 551642 through 551644, 551692 through 
551694, 600110, 600192, 600531 through 600544 or 600610 through 600644, 
There is also a second general rule for the chapter which is applicable 
Chapter Rule 2:  Apparel goods of this Chapter shall be considered to originate if they are both cut and sewn or 
otherwise assembled in the territory of one or more of the Parties and if the fabric of the outer shell, exclusive of 
collars or cuffs, is wholly of one or more of the following: 
(a) Velveteen fabrics of subheading 580123, containing 85 percent or more by weight of cotton; 
(b) Corduroy fabrics of subheading 580122, containing 85 percent or more by weight of cotton and containing more 
than 7.5 wales per centimeter; 
(c) Fabrics of subheading 511111 or 511119, if hand-woven, with a loom width of less than 76 cm, woven in the 
United Kingdom in accordance with the rules and regulations of the Harris Tweed Association, Ltd., and so certified 
by the Association; 
(d) Fabrics of subheading 511230, weighing not more than 340 grams per square meter, containing wool, not less 
than 20 percent by weight of fine animal hair and not less than 15 percent by weight of man-made staple fibers; or 
(e) Batiste fabrics of subheading 551311 or 551321, of square construction, of single yarns esceeding 76 metric 
count, containing between 60 and 70 warp ends and filling picks per square centimeter, of a weight not exceeding 
110 grams per square meter 
  Brenton then suggests that “the basic rule of origin stipulates of chapter but then provides a list of headings 
and chapters from which inputs cannot be used.  Thus in effect the overcoat must be manufactured from the stage of 
wool fibres forward.  In addition, Chapter Rule 1 stipulates that the visible lining used must be produced from yarn 
and finished in either party.  This rule may well have been introduced to constrain the impact of the tolerance rule 
which would normally allow 7 per cent of the weight of the article to be of non-originating materials.  In overcoats 
and suits the lining is probably less than 7 per cent of the total weight.  The second chapter rule seems to provide 
very specific exemptions to the rules of origin for materials which are in short-supply or not produced in the US or  
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duties disappear in 12 years.  Bilateral export subsidies will likely be banned, and a bilateral 
agricultural safeguards mechanism (snapbacks) installed.  The treatment of sugar will be of 
particular interest to the South African province of Kwa-Zulu-Natal and Swaziland.  If the Chile 
agreement is the precedent, the US will insist on SACU not replacing sweeteners exported to the 
US by lower-priced imports from elsewhere.  Similarly, wine may be a contentious issue. 
  For the US, the opportunity is to gain improved market access to a much smaller but 
more heavily protected Southern African market.  For Southern Africa, it is improved access to 
the large US market, with the added benefit of being quota free in textiles/apparel if content rules 
are met, should whatever trade regime which eventually follows on from the MFA (from 2004) 
continue to have some form of quotas in my newly negotiated post MFA arrangement. 
  Trade in Services 
  There has been a substantial amount of recent literature attention given to the impact of 
services liberalization in developing countries.  Mattoo et al (2001) have claimed from 
econometric work large growth effects in developing countries (1½ percentage points a year) 
from certain forms of services trade liberalization.  Dee and Hanslow (2000) have produced 
FTAP (a version of GTAP) model based calculations showing very large gains as a percentage of 
GDP for certain countries (11% for China).  Some therefore argue that services liberalization is 
the key trade policy issue for developing countries in both regional and multilateral 
liberalization. 
  However, other studies produce much smaller gains, and there are issues with data and 
the representation of barriers in ad valorem form.  Also these studies apply to genuinely 
                                                                                                                                                             
in Singapore, see category (c) for example, and reflects firm specific lobbying to overcome the restrictiveness of 
these rules of origin when the original NAFTA rules of origin were defined.”  
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multilateral liberalization, rather than the more asymmetric liberalization that may occur in 
SACU.  Nonetheless, the potential is there for this to be the most significant part of a SACU 
agreement in terms of positive impacts on SACU members. 
  If the Chilean precedent is followed, SACU will be asked to take on significant 
liberalization in the areas of banking, insurance, securities, and other related services.  Under the 
Chilean arrangement, US insurance firms have full rights (with only very limited exceptions) to 
establish subsidiaries or joint ventures in Chile for all insurance sectors (life, nonlife, 
reinsurance, brokerage).  US banks and securities firms may establish branches and subsidiaries, 
and invest in local firms without restriction, and offer services to Chilean citizens participating in 
Chile’s privatized voluntary savings plans.  In telecoms, US phone companies can interconnect 
with Chilean networks at non-discriminatory rates.  In E-Commerce and Digital products, duties 
are based on physical value (e.g. the disc, not the music).  We anticipate these and other 
components being in a US-SACU agreement, but perhaps with little by way of new liberalization 
occurring on the US side. 
The services area will pose special problems for SACU.  First, with no coverage of 
services in SACU, if SACU is to negotiate as a single entity it will first have to agree on 
common positions among its members.  Beyond trade and directly related issues, it is important 
to note that there are no SACU-wide arrangements on most of the non-goods trade issues likely 
to be on the agenda for a US-SACU bilateral.   
Second, service sectors in each SACU country are heavily regulated, and if a US-SACU 
FTA includes services, major change both within SACU members and between members will be 
required in this area.    
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Third, and perhaps most importantly, the liberalization requested of SACU could well be 
asymmetric and heavily so in some key sectors such as banking and insurance.  While four of the 
five SACU members are part of the Rand Monetary Area,
4 whose currencies are irrevocably 
fixed to the South African Rand, licensing of banks and banking supervision in each SACU 
member is handled by each country’s central bank under its national legislation.  The same 
applies to insurance and other financial services such as mutual funds.  In most cases the national 
legislation requires incorporation and capitalization in the country.  The emphasis has been on 
maintaining solvent financial institutions to protect depositors’ and policy-holders’ interests.  
Any proposal to establish free trade in banking and other financial services between SACU and 
the US would require significant modification of current practices in these critical areas and in 
different ways in each SACU country.   
  Investment 
  Major bilateral protection of investors along the lines of the NAFTA agreement will 
likely be proposed.  These may include rights to establish, acquire, and operate investments in 
either region on an equal footing; rights to due process protection and fair market value 
compensation in the event of expropriation.  Local content rules on inputs to be used by investors 
will likely be banned.  None of these provisions currently apply under the SACU treaty.  Some 
SACU members have investment promotion schemes that are biased in favor of citizen 
entrepreneurs. 
 Intellectual  Property 
Here existing (or get to be implemented) WTO levels of intellectual property protection 
                                                 
4 The exception is Botswana which established its own independent currency in 1976, and has since accumulated 
over US$5 billion in foreign exchange reserves.  
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will likely be enhanced in several ways, as in the Chilean agreement. There will be protection for 
copyrighted works in digital form, expanded protection for patents and trade secrets, and firmer 
penalties for piracy and counterfeiting. 
  SACU currently does not deal with IPR issues, and in some of the countries there are 
effectively only limited (or no) intellectual property regimes given the lags in implementation of 
WTO disciplines.  This will again pose tough challenges and require major change for some 
SACU members. 
 Competition  Policy 
  SACU members will likely be requested (following the Chilean agreement) to 
install/maintain competition laws that prohibit anti-competitive business behavior, and regulate 
state owned enterprises.  At present, laws governing competition in SACU members are focused 
not so much on ensuring open markets but on preserving certain activities from outside 
competition.  The new SACU agreement requires members to have competition policies. 
Whether or not individual country laws can conform with the range of commitments contained in 
the US-Chile agreement is an open question. 
 Government  Procurement 
  The Chilean agreement in effect extends WTO procurement agreements to all regional 
and municipal governments in both countries; and a US-SACU agreement could take similar 
form.  This may require abandonment of domestic preference in government procurement in 
place in several SACU members, and could be particularly problematic for South Africa with its 
separate provincial jurisdictions.  
 Customs  Procedures  
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  Information sharing, and transparency provisions would likely apply here.  There are no 
formal common customs procedures currently in SACU, but in practice there is considerable co-
operation in dealing with fraud and similar matters.  Plans are afoot to create a common customs 
declaration form to be used to document each transaction for each of the exporting and importing 
countries on intra-SACU trade. 
  Temporary Entry of Personnel 
  If the Chilean model is followed, NAFTA style temporary entry visas will also apply.  
They are without limit for entry to Chile, but on the US side limited to holders of 4 year degrees, 
and subject to a numerical cap.  SACU, we presume, could be asked to enter into similar 
arrangements. 
  Labor and Environment 
  On both labor and the environment, given the flux on these issues in the WTO, the likely 
content of a US-SACU bilateral agreement is less clear.  Worker rights as set out in the ILO will 
likely be reaffirmed, and there will likely be joint environmental projects, as in the Chile 
agreement.  Special environmental dispute settlement procedures for environmental cases could 
enter.  Some form of environment impact assessment might also be agreed. 
   Dispute Settlement 
  Bilateral dispute settlement as in the Chilean agreement may be adopted.  An important 
new feature could be provision for fines to enforce rulings.  With the thrust to establish new 
FTAs, pressures on US bilateral dispute resolution from the number of potential pairwise panels 
could become a factor.  If NAFTA provides any lessons it is that bilateral dispute resolution 
arrangements will not fully restrain US contingent protection practices in anti-dumping and  
  -19- 
countervailing duties. 
  In sum, a US-SACU agreement could involve bilateral free trade in goods (with rules of 
origin, especially in textiles/apparel and autos), asymmetric liberalization in services, bilateral 
investment protections, strengthened intellectual property arrangements, arrangements on 
competition policies and a series of related measures in other areas.  Bilateral preferential access 
in goods would be temporary if eventually superceded by WTO non-agriculture tariff elimination 
in the Doha Round in 2015 as the US has proposed. 
Issues in Non Commodity Trade Areas 
  In many ways, it is the non commodity trade areas of a US-SACU agreement which are 
simultaneously the most challenging and rewarding in terms of the potential benefits which 
could accrue to both parties, but also the most problematic.  SACU members will face many 
difficulties, not the least of which is that SACU is only an agreement covering trade in goods.  
Present SACU negotiating capability in these areas is extremely limited.  In the WTO it is 
accepted that there is a need to develop negotiating capacity in these areas in lower income 
countries.  Similar issues now arise in preferential trade agreements.  These and other issues are 
explored in the recent paper by Mattoo and Fink (2002). 
  Another central issue in this area will be the extent to which potential commitments by 
SACU are both in reality and perceived to be unbalanced.  If the broad deal is understood 
effectively as bilaterally accelerated tariff removal in goods for what anyway (under current US 
WTO proposals) would largely disappear by 2010 and totally so by 2015, in return for large and 
mainly unreciprocated liberalization in non trade areas by SACU, such a deal may well be 
rejected by SACU as insufficiently balanced.  
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  In services it is likely that commitments will be sought by the US across a wide range of 
sectors.  Taking the Chilean agreement as a guide, this could include some degree of two way 
commitment in a list of peripheral services, including computer and related services, telecom 
services, audiovisual services, construction and engineering, tourism, advertising, express 
delivery, professional services (architects, engineers, accountants), distribution services, adult 
educational training, and environmental services.  However, the core services of banking, 
insurance, and telecoms could well be areas where mainly only SACU commitments would 
apply.  These would open cross border supply of insurance and banking services, brokerage, 
retirement income advice and management and other services. 
  In investment, the focus will likely be on investor guarantees, somewhat similar to 
Chapter 11 arrangements in NAFTA.  Intellectual property would strengthen and extend 
arrangements into new areas including digital content.  An especially significant set of issues 
will likely arise with drugs and patent protection related to social calamities, as discussed 
recently in the WTO.  SACU will no doubt raise issues connected with AIDS related 
medications. 
  In competition policy, South Africa’s post-apartheid policy thrust has been to open up 
markets to competition, and the smaller SACU members have also all been developing new 
competition policies harmonized with the South African approach.  These approaches may not be 
compatible with the US approach.  However, one major benefit to SACU of a SACU-US 
agreement to SACU consumers might be to allow freer entry of US firms to compete with local 
firms. 
  Negotiating new bilateral labor migration rules poses special difficulties, and any  
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liberalization on the US side will likely be numerically restricted, and limited in other ways as in 
the Chilean agreement.  The parallel development of US-SACU dispute resolution mechanisms 
may also prove challenging.  SACU's new agreement, for instance, contains an untried provision 
under which the council of ministers refers disputes to ad hoc tribunals. 
  We see these non commodity trade issues as perhaps the most significant quantitatively 
for both SACU and the US (even if few or no studies exist), and the hardest to negotiate.  There 
is both limited capacity to negotiate on the SACU side, and a perceived (if not actual) one 
sidedness to this part of any negotiated arrangement. 
Third Parties 
  Any new bilateral preferential trade agreement will potentially have effects on third 
parties with which there are existing preferential trading arrangements.  In the case of SACU, 
members are involved in preferential trading arrangements with two important third parties:  the 
European Union (EU) and the Southern African Development Community (SADC). 
  The EU-South Africa and the EU-ACP (Cotonou) Agreements 
  One motive for the US to establish trade and related agreements in many parts of the 
world is undoubtedly competition with either earlier or proposed EU initiatives made in the same 
direction.
5  The idea is to restore a level playing field for US exporters in foreign markets from 
EU preferential agreements.  It is likely then that the EU-South African agreement of 1999 has 
been one factor in the US identifying SACU as a bilateral target for a US FTA negotiation. 
  Following its change in government, South Africa had hoped to be included in the EU’s 
agreements with former colonies; the Africa, Caribbean, and Pacific (ACP) countries.  The  
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asymmetrical nature of the then EU-ACP agreement, providing ACP countries with preferential 
access to the EU market while not requiring the reverse, was particularly attractive to South 
Africa.  Arguing that certain aspects of the South African economy resemble a developed 
economy, the EU instead developed a two track arrangement with South Africa: (1) a free trade 
agreement between the EU and South Africa, signed in 1999; and (2) inclusion of South Africa 
in the renewed arrangement with the ACP, the Cotonou Agreement (2000), but (3) explicit 
exclusion of South Africa from the trade arrangements of the Cotonou Agreement and from 
access to the soft loan European Development Fund.
6 
  The FTA portion of the EU-South African agreement covers 90% of bilateral trade, but 
has some significant exceptions.  Separately negotiated agreements cover entry into the EU of 
wines and spirits, as well as fisheries (still in process).  South Africa continues to restrict entry of 
various industrial items, including motor vehicles, and some textiles.  In addition, there are 
safeguard provisions when imports cause injury to a national industry. 
  Several trade related issues, such as competition policy, intellectual property rights, free 
movement of capital, and technical barriers to trade are covered, but importantly core services 
(banking, insurance, telecom, and transportation) are not.  Generally the language is couched in 
terms of objectives, with ‘consultations’ and ‘close cooperation’ as the mechanisms.  In both the 
EU-SA and the Cotonou agreements the EU includes a reference to the importance of democratic 
principles, human rights, and the rule of law.  Each party is free to employ ‘appropriate 
measures’ unilaterally if the other violates those principles. 
                                                                                                                                                             
5  The Congressional Research Service paper on FTAs (Cooper 2003) notes that the EU has FTAs with a number of 
countries, and explicitly notes the existence of the Canada-Chile and Mexico-Chile FTAs, and the Japan-Singapore 
FTA. 
6 The Cotonou Agreement also includes provision for phasing in reciprocal trade concessions commencing 2008.  
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  From a US point of view a US-SACU agreement would redress the trade advantage 
currently enjoyed by EU exporters over US exporters in the South African market, and give 
preferences to US exporters in the rest of SACU markets.  As a driver of a US-SACU agreement, 
the role of the prior EU-South Africa agreement seems clear.  But in the key areas of autos and 
textiles different trade rules will apply.  It is very likely that the US would seek preferred access 
to the still highly protected SACU auto market.  Yet if multilateral elimination of non 
agricultural tariffs were to be achieved by 2015, all such effects would be temporary. 
  Also, it is important to highlight the sharp differences in architecture between the US and 
EU approaches.  The EU negotiates defacto separately with South Africa and other SACU 
countries, recognizing their differences.  The EU agreement explicitly states the wider 
humanitarian goals that underlie wider foreign policy, and proceeds to link them to trade.  The 
EU agreement does not deal centrally with service and key non trade issues.  If the US objective 
were only to compete with the EU, maybe it would do the same.  Maybe the strategy is to go 
beyond the EU in to new areas to establish new US advantage.  Maybe the EU response will be 
to renegotiate, also extending into new areas.  All these issues await resolution, but the need to 
consider the interplay between these agreements is inescapable. 
  The Southern African Development Community 
  The five members of SACU all belong to the 14 member Southern African Development 
Community (SADC), and most SADC members have signed a FTA protocol
7 effective 
September 2000, which envisions almost complete intra-SADC free trade by the year 2012.  
Hanging over the SADC FTA are a complex set of rules of origin, which differ across different 
types of goods (Flatters 2002).  Rules of origin are not an issue within SACU, given the common  
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external tariff.
8  Hence, the potential for inconsistencies between the protection of goods 
originating within SACU and goods originating elsewhere within SADC is substantial.
9  It is 
perhaps for this reason that in mid 2002, the SADC Executive Secretary proposed that SADC 
move to a customs union.  This complex combination of actual and proposed preferential trading 
arrangements is illustrated in Figure 1.  
Figure 1 
Overlapping Trade Relationships Between SACU, the US, SADC, and the EU 
 
                                                                                                                                                             
7Angola, DR Congo, and Seychelles have not yet signed the SADC trade protocol. 
8 Rules of origin issues arising from the EU-SA FTA are avoided by EU treating all SACU origin inputs as South 
African for purposes of calculating origin, and the BLNS being content to purchase lower-priced goods that enter 
duty-free through South Africa. 
9 A further wrinkle is that two members of SACU (Namibia and Swaziland) also belong to the Common Market for 
Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA), although they cannot grant duty-free entry to COMESA origin goods.  
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  Several SACU members also have bilateral free trade agreements with regional non-
members, including Zimbabwe, Malawi, and Mozambique.   
  The overall picture that is one where both the US and the EU engage in a series of 
bilateral preferential arrangements, Ronald Wonnacott (1996) calls a ‘hub and spoke’ system 
(Wonnacott, 1996):  The hubs in this case are either the US or the EU, and the spokes are the 
individual countries or regions that have or are considering preferential bilateral trading 
arrangements with each hub.  While competition between the EU and the US may hasten 
multilateral free trade, in the meantime there may be other significant effects that need to be 
included in any evaluation of impact.  For each spoke of an existing preferential arrangement, the 
addition of another spoke will reduce its margin of preference into the hub.  This effect applies 
particularly to the non-SACU members of SADC in their relationship with SACU.  Further, the 
individual spokes could gain by collectively dealing with the hub rather than individually.  For 
this reason, SACU clearly has an interest in coordinating its negotiations in concert with other 
US bilateral partners. 
  Within this context of preexisting cross cutting preferential trading arrangements in 
Southern Africa, new institutions barely underway, and a substantial unfinished agenda of intra-
SACU policy development, the proposed US-SACU FTA poses challenges to SACU to both 
determine and promote the interests of its members in any negotiations.  It is in part because of 
all these complexities, limited intra-SACU coverage across non trade areas, complex bilaterals, 
limited negotiating capacity in some of the smaller SACU countries, and the need for a prior 
SACU negotiation that an obvious prior question arises.  From the point of view of all the parties  
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to the proposed SACU-US FTA, might not a dual track arrangement, of the US-SA and US-
BLNS, in a manner similar to the relationship between the EU and SA and the BLNS (under the 
Cotonou Agreement) be simpler, easier, and quicker to negotiate?  The economic impacts for the 
US would be much the same, but the complexities much reduced.  Alternatively, an asymmetric 
treatment of the smaller/poorer SACU members, allowing a longer period of adjustment, might 
be contemplated.  We put such issues to one side, given the stated US aim of bilaterally 
negotiating with SACU, and turn now to assessing the impacts of a US-SACU arrangement. 
Assessing the Impacts of US-SACU Arrangement 
  Evaluating the impact of a possible US-SACU arrangement involves an assessment of 
what the initial barriers to flows of goods and services and levels of intellectual property 
protection are used by the two parties; the relative sizes of the potential markets, and the sizes of 
current and potential flows; as well as the strength of possible negative trade and service 
diversion effects.  Once these possible impacts are known, then an evaluation of the narrower 
commercial policy incentives to participate can be judged for the two parties.  This discussion 
puts on one side, for one moment, whether there is also a humanitarian/development/implicit aid 
objective for the United States; so that contributing to a rebuilding of African society even if the 
balance of commercial advantage goes against the US, might nonetheless motivate participation.  
There are also other initiatives already underway, including the US AGOA of 2000, and so a 
bilateral agreement also needs to be evaluated relative to a changing trade policy environment. 
  The principal trade flows in the bilateral US-SACU relationship are set out in Table 2.  
The US now runs a substantial merchandise trade deficit with SACU, the outcome of rapid  
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growth of SACU exports to the US in recent years, against stagnant US exports to SACU.
10  US 
imports from SACU are dominated by platinum (for catalytic converters) and diamonds, which 
are already largely duty free, but SACU exports of autos/parts, and apparel are growing rapidly.  
US exports of manufactures to SACU face significant tariffs, which are still moderately high, 
although they have come down substantially in recent years (Table 3).
11  Service trade flows, for 
now, are probably small, but data are not readily available.   







1996  1997  1998  1999  2000  2001   2002 
7110    Platinum  744  754 1,006 1,002 1,529 1,534 1,173 
7102    Diamonds  105 163 163 144 342 474 517 
87   Motor vehicles & parts  46  57  76  120  150  359  573 
61&62  Apparel  143 180 205 241 321 441 603 
72    Iron  &  steel  338 306 467 393 462 289 302 
26    Ores,  slag  &  ash  274 282 330 340 269 243 248 
84    Mechanical  appliances  79  72  91 121 154 253 235 
Other  741  899  912 1,027 1,252 1,178 1,108 






      
84    Mechanical  appliances 793 756 763 578 541 540 501 
88    Aircraft  162 178 733 400 609 631 317 
87   Motor vehicles and 
parts 
260 264 286 147 238 457 287 
85   Electrical mach. & 
equip. 
239 238 284 199 198 200 160 
90   Optical  instruments  149 157 168 155 148 153 150 
  Other  1,509 1,408 1,356 1,148 1,214 1,142 1,139 
  Total  3,112 3,001 3,590 2,627 2,948 3,123 2,554 
 
BILATERAL BALANCE  642 288 340  (761) (1,531)  (1,648) (2,205)
Source: USITC, Dataweb. 
                                                 
10 A large part of the change is probably due to the dramatic real depreciation of the Rand against the US Dollar.  
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  Our evaluation of the impact of a US-SACU agreement follows on from what we have 
set out in the earlier section.  While labeled as a Free Trade Agreement, the reality of such an 
agreement is more complex than this.  A Free Trade Agreement suggests the central element as 
trade in goods, but much more is involved in this case (services, investment, intellectual 
property, labor mobility, dispute settlement, and others).  Also, post Uruguay Round formal tariff 
barriers are already low.
12  While they are significantly higher on the SACU than on the US side, 
save for remaining tariff peaks in textiles and apparel, average tariffs facing SACU exports are 
already low in US markets.  These may anyway be phased out through multilateral negotiation in 
the WTO Doha Round.  More significant access issues for SACU are contingent protection 
(antidumping and countervailing duties).  These are governed by US quasi-judicial process 
which is unlikely to be affected by a bilateral US-SACU arrangement. 
Table 3: 
SACU Tariff Structure, 2000 and 1997 
 










Agriculture  295 0.8 1.4 4.2 5.6
Mining 107  14.5 0 1.2  1.4
Manufacturing  5479 84.7 8.6 6.7 15.6
G a s   2  000  0
Total 5883  100 7.3 6.5  15.1
Source: Cassim et al., 2002, Table 3.11 
Note: The source indicates that the tariff data refer to South Africa.  However, since there is a common 
external tariff, and many of the goods destined for the BLNS markets pass through South Africa, the data are a 
reasonable representation of SACU’s tariffs. 
 
                                                                                                                                                             
11 The IMF (2002) reports that the average unweighted tariff rate in 1990 was 30%. 
12 See also, however, the discussion of effects of regional trade agreements in Burfisher, Robinson and Thierfelder 
(2003) that stresses new trade theory considerations.  
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  In contrast, major barriers remain in the services area where domestic regulation 
segments services markets in banking, insurance, telecoms, and transportation services.  This 
segmentation is both across US-SACU, and within SACU.  While bilateral service US-SACU 
flows are still small relative to goods flows (data is a major problem here), the barriers which 
apply through licensing and other restrictions are major.  The key here, if the Chilean agreement 
is a guide, is that what the US will likely seek is in many ways one sided liberalization:  i.e., freer 
entry for US service providers to SACU markets with little reciprocal access improvement 
offered to US service markets.  It may be that SACU providers cannot anyway compete in US 
markets, but unless improved access is offered this will never be tested. 
  In addition, liberalization offered in other non manufactures trade areas is also highly 
asymmetric in the Chilean case.  Short term entry permits for professionals are unconstrained for 
entry to Chile, but are to be numerically capped to the US.  Agricultural liberalization occurs 
over four years on the Chilean side, but over 12 years on the US side.  Investment protections are 
designed for US investors in Chile, rather than for Chilean investors in the US.   
  Thus, one could view the US-Chile agreement as primarily an asymmetric package for 
the liberalization of non manufactures trade barriers.  If a US-SACU negotiation takes this same 
direction, its evaluation on the SACU side may be influenced by this perception.  SACU 
exporters in textiles might gain by being quota-free in the US market, but depending on what 
follows the MFA, this may be worth less than might appear.  Given the relative absence of 
services arrangements in SACU, to be plunged into effectively unilateral liberalization in 
services (which did not occur with the EU-SA agreement of 1999) may be hard for SACU to 
deal with institutionally and politically, even if there are substantial domestic consumer benefits.  
  -30- 
  The more direct impacts which may follow on trade and other bilateral flows are 
unfortunately conjectural at best at this point.  Mattoo et al (2003) assess the impacts of AGOA 
as surprisingly small, and attribute this to the restrictions from rules of origin.  Bhagwati (2002) 
suggests that the majority of benefits for smaller entities such as SACU from these types of 
arrangements could potentially be achieved by unilateral liberalization without the trade 
diversion costs of regional agreements, although this neglects the access benefits to US markets.  
Collier and Gunning (1999) discuss reasons for poor African growth and do not have access 
barriers high on their list.  Brenton and Machin (2003) highlight the role of rules of origin in 
making EU agreements work, something that also may apply to a US-SACU arrangement. 
  Inter alia, most trade liberalization and removal or lowering of trade barriers is viewed by 
economists as good; and economic theory clearly suggests that as the smaller partner SACU 
should benefit more than proportionately from a US-SACU arrangement.  Theory also suggests 
that there is likely to be trade diversion where existing barriers are high, such as in services.  But 
the combination of an FTA with temporary and small barriers in the large market and all the add 
on diversions does not guarantee that such an arrangement will be welfare enhancing.  Also, such 
an arrangement in being so broad, may prove too difficult to negotiate with the whole of SACU 
at this time of flux.  Simpler alternatives may need to be explored. 
Developmental Implications for Southern Africa and Concluding Remarks 
  In our view, the political reality is that debate in both SACU and the US on a US-SACU 
FTA will not be able to be delinked from wider foreign policy and developmental issues, nor 
perhaps should it.  Some of the key questions raised may be; would a proposed US-SACU FTA 
contribute to the development of the Southern African region?  Would it contribute to a  
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reduction of poverty in the region?  If so, in what ways?  Will unemployment rates in South 
Africa and in SACU grow with liberalization? 
  It is widely acknowledged that successful development depends on good policies 
(Burnside and Dollar 2000).  Among the 'good policies' usually credited for successful 
development is the alignment of domestic prices with world market prices, usually achieved by 
movement towards freer trade.  Such a policy stance also limits the power of domestic 
monopolies, and the power of specific interests to capture transfers from the rest of society, both 
of which force entrepreneurs to continuously pursue innovation, on which productivity growth 
depends.  Empirical work which draws on both developing and mature economies offers 
evidence that trade has a significant and positive effect on growth (Frankel and Romer 1999), 
although Mattoo et al. (2003) argue the size of the effect is uncertain.  This suggests that the US-
SACU FTA, and a fortiori in combination with the EU-SA FTA, by hastening the process of 
trade and market liberalization, could bring substantial development benefits to the region.  
  Major caution is in order, however, even over this qualified claim of benefit.  First, the 
poverty effects in SACU of an FTA with the US may be negative.  While in general it is 
reasonable to presume, after Bhagwati and Srinivasan (2002), that trade promotes growth, and 
growth reduces absolute poverty, the opposite outcome is possible in the current circumstances 
of SACU. Given the distortions in both the goods markets and the factor markets of SACU, and 
the partial nature of any US-SACU trade liberalization, it would be too facile to presume a 
positive effect on the poor.  Further, the region’s comparative advantage is based on natural 
resources, while natural resources and capital appear to be complementary inputs.
13  In these 
circumstances, a movement towards freer trade will very likely reduce demand for labor in a  
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labor market that is already exhibiting significant evidence of unemployment.
14  Thus for poverty 
reduction to result from trade liberalization, the distortions giving rise to the unemployment must 
also be tackled.  This link between liberalization and unemployment is likely to be a central issue 
in the debate on an agreement within SACU. 
  Second, as Collier and Gunning (1999) contend, non trade issues are the more critical in 
explaining Africa’s slower growth performance.  A particularly significant issue is the 
development of institutions.  Easterly and Levine’s recent work (2002) argues that once one 
controls for institutions, the effect of good policies on growth disappears.  If that is the case, we 
need to be concerned about SACU’s regional and national institutions' effectiveness.  This 
applies not only to the question of negotiating and then administering new policies and 
programs, such as the proposed US-SACU FTA, but also the effectiveness of national economic 
institutions. 
  South Africa, over the twentieth century, developed effective institutions that reflected 
the wishes of the governing interests.  As the governing interests changed in the 1990s, the 
institutions were largely maintained -- by both the Government of National Unity and by the 
ANC-led government. Unlike the change-over in Zimbabwe in 1980, the experience base of 
existing South African institutions was kept intact.  Consequently, today's economic institutions 
are both effective and largely reflect the wishes of the new governing interests.  
  Botswana, which has maintained both institutional and political continuity since its 
Independence in 1966, is similarly reasonably well positioned to negotiate and administer a new 
arrangement, and to reap the growth benefits from the increased openness.  Namibia, which has 
                                                                                                                                                             
13 Alleyne and Subramanian (2001) show that South Africa’s exports are capital intensive. 
14 The IMF (2002) cites the official unemployment rate for 2001 as 28.8%.  
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been independent for a far shorter period (since 1990), along with Lesotho and Swaziland which 
have ongoing constitutional debates, are less well equipped institutionally. 
  The new SACU is only now commencing the building of its institutions.  While the new 
institutions will be able to draw on the experience base of its members, the SACU institutions 
themselves have yet to develop.  SACU policies dealing with industrial development, 
competition, and 'unfair' trade practices face a significant gestation period.  Yet such SACU 
policies may be a pre-requisite for agreement with the US on many of the non-trade issues that 
the US will likely seek to include in any agreement.  The need for considerable patience on the 
part of all parties to the negotiation is clear.  The US will need to be patient with the need for 
SACU to develop policy positions, and SACU will need to be patient with a potentially over-
stretched USTR. 
  The promise of substantial American funding for technical assistance announced at the 
time of Robert  Zoellick’s January 2003 visit to South Africa may be of some help in the 
institution building process.  However, unless that technical assistance is perceived by the SACU 
governments and the new SACU institutions as working to promote their interests, and not 
simply pushing the agenda of the donor, as has happened all too often with donor-funded advice, 
it will do little to promote an agreement that is seen to benefit all parties.  Another non-trade 
issue that is likely to be on the table is the matter of capital controls.  As Weintraub’s paper in 
this volume makes clear, capital controls were prohibited in the Chile
15 and Singapore 
agreements at the insistence of the US Treasury.  Chile, in particular, had been relatively 
successful for several years at avoiding the disruptive effect of ‘hot money” on the real side of 
                                                 
15  Chile is allowed to impose restrictions for 12 months on certain types of speculative capital, as long as those 
restrictions do not substantially impede transfers.    
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the economy.  On more than one occasion in the past, South Africa has used the financial rand to 
separate the exchange rate for current account transactions from the exchange rate for capital 
account transactions, allowing real adjustment to a major capital flow to be made gradually over 
months, not days.  The governments of the countries of Southern Africa may not be willing to 
give up this degree of freedom among the instruments available to it to deal with international 
financial disturbances. 
  On balance, however, we believe that since the principal impact of a US-SACU FTA will 
be to align SACU prices more closely with world prices the effect on the region is likely to be 
positive.  Such an agreement may also prove the opportunity for SACU member governments to 
launch much needed regulatory reform which is particularly important in unleashing the forces 
of “creative distruction” (Aghion and Howitt).  To be seen to be pressing a growth-promoting 
agenda is clearly in the foreign policy interests of the US.  Further, this thrust is likely to 
coincide with the new governing interests in South Africa, which are less captive of the import-
substitution sector that was built up under apartheid.  The rest of SACU has a fundamental 
interest in freer trade with the rest of the world, as the bulk of consumer goods are protected by 
the common external tariff, and most exports sell on the world, not regional, markets.  If this 
change in incentives can be accompanied by reduction of factor market distortions, especially in 
South Africa, and effective SACU institution building, then the development benefits for the 
region will begin to flow.  
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